Without the trust that mAssets should be pegged to oracle prices, mAsset prices could theoretically diverge from oracle prices. Unlike minting liquidation which can create buying pressure to drive prices upwards, the Mirror protocol can only drive downward pressure to the minimum collateral price of an mAsset. For instance, if the MCR of an asset is 150% and the oracle price of XXX is $100, then the price of an mXXX could, in theory, reach $150. However, once the price of mXXX is greater than $150, then arbitrageurs can simply mint mXXX with $150 worth of collateral, sell the mXXX for $160, and forego the collateral. Therefore, the theoretical maximum price of mXXX would be $150. If, in practice, mAsset prices did drift significantly higher than oracle prices, governance could be used to solve this by creating incentives to mint and sell assets. For instance, the MCR could be lowered in order to reign in mAsset prices or negative selling fees could be used to incentivize users to mint assets and sell them in the market. Changing governance, however, would require a proposal and the collective agreement of MIR stakers.